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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
January 14, 1983 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 2 
No. 82-708 
#/ SUMMA CORP. , Cert to Calif. s. Ct. (Mosk, Bird, Newman, 
Broussard; Richa~dson, Kaus diisentirig) 
"/v. L.A. 
(J"- CALIFORNIA, etc., et al. State/Civil Timely (with ext.) 
1. SUMMARY: Did the California s. Ct err in imposing a 
"public trust" on property derived from a federally-patented 
Mexican land grant? 
.--, 7 
2. FACTS & DECISION BELOW: In 1839, while California was 
still part of Mexico, the local governor of the province granted 
CV~G - bee~~ "l~ ~"~ wJJ.. ~ ~~~ 
~ .. ~-~-~ s~'s.. ~ ~ ~ ~ 1c.&.-. ~~ ~aaii, 
• 
a seaside rty known as Rancho Ballena to the Machados and -
Rancho Ballena, known today as the Ballena . ... 
Lagoo,!!_, is an arm of the Pacific Ocean in the Marina del Rey area 
of Los Angeles. It is currently tidelands; at high tide it is 
covered by from one to six feet of water. At low tide it is ~ 
virtually ~ Y• Petr owns a parcel of land in what formerly was~ 
Rancho Ballena. (~ ~ ~~ 
In 1848 California w_a s ceded to the United States. -1 The ~•) 
q&r~ 
Guadalupe Hidalgo Treaty of that yea iforovided that the rights of 
Mexican citizens in their property were tq be "inviolably 
, 
respected." In order to fufill this treaty obligation, Congress 
enacted in 1851 "An Act to ascertain and settle the private Land 
Claims in the State of California", 9 Stat. 631 (The Act of 
1851). This act established a Board of Land Commissioners to 
hear claims to property by Mexican citizens and issue federal 
patents for valid claims. 
The Machados and Talamantes who had received Rancho 
Ballena from the Mexican government -- petitioned the Board of 
Land Commissioners for a patent confirming their title to the 
property. Although the Board confirmed the claim and a federal 
DC upheld the confirmation, difficulties developed during the 
subsequent survey to fix the precise boundaries of the property. 
Among other things, it appears that it was claimed that the 
Ranchos Ballena consisted in part of tidelands, and that such 
proper~y was not patentable. This issue was referred to the 
General Land Office Commissioner, who decided, on the basis of 
'---- three affidavits, that the land in question was not tidelands. A 
; 
- 3 -
patent was issued for the entire claim. At an unidentified time 
afterwards a portion of the claim was conveyed to petr in fee. 
In the early 1970's the city of Los Angeles determined to 
dredge the Ballena Lagoon. In order to avoid the expense of a 
condemnation proceeding, it filed an action in state court to 
quiet title against owners of property in the area, including 
petr, claiming that it possessed various types of easements to 
the property that permitred such dredging. (The city eventually 
changed its mind about dredging, and instead determined that the 
, - ~ 
property should remain undeveloped and open to the public 
which petr apparently resisted.) The state of California, named 
as a defendant, claimed that it had acquired an interest in the 
property upon admission to the Union, that this interest C-e:,~£-s 
permitted it to put the property to public use without payment of ~ 
compensation, and that it had given this interest to the city. 
It relied on a line of California cases establishing the 
trust" doctrine which provides that the state holds an interest .... ~,,,..., 
in tidelands that allows it to use the properties "for purposes 
such as commerce, navigation, and fishing, as well as for 
environmental and recreational purposes." Petn App. at Al. 
The <c agreed with the state, holding that the city could 
dredge the 17 n without exercising its powers of eminent 
domain. The California Court of Appeal reversed, and the 
citiJppealed to the California s. Ct, which upheld the TC's 
decision on the grounds that the state retained a "public trust" - --------- ---interest in the lands. 
- 4 -
a:> 
The S. Ct first held that the land in question 
constituted tidelands, relying upon apparently uncontroverted 
testimony of "[e]xperts in the field of geology and 
geomorphology." This finding was critical to the determination -that the "public trust" doctrine was applicable to petr's 
property, since California law extend~ e doctrine only to 
tidelands. Next, the court found that the Guadalupe Hidalgo 
Treaty, the Act of 1851, and the federal land patent did not 
destroy California's "public trust" interest in the lands. 
The court reasoned that the first owners of the property 
in question the Machados and Talamantes -- had taken title 
subject to the Mexican government's "public trust" rights. The 
s. Ct relied on the testimony of experts in 19th century Mexican 
- law for this conclusion. Next, the court decided that when the 
United States annexed California it acquired Mexico's public 
trust interest. Recognizing that there "is little authority 
regarding this issue," the court determined that since the Act of 
1851 gave the US fee interests in unpatented land, there was no 
reason it should not also give lesser interests, such as a 
"public trust" interest. 
Finally, the California S. Ct decided that the issuance 
of the federal land patent for Rancho Ballona in fee did not 
affect the stat~•s "pub1ic trust" interest. The court recognized 
. 
that numerous decisions by this Court established that a federal 
land patent conclusively determined that the grantee possesses 
title to the land described within and that this interest 
! prevailed over later claims of ownership by private parties or 
- 5 -
the government, citing Knight v. US Land Ass'n, 142 US 161, 184 
(1891); San Francisco v. LeRoy, 138 us 656, 670-71 (1891); US v. 
Coronado Beach Co., 255 US 472, 487-88 (1921). These cases were 
distinguished by the California court on the ground that they 
involved only claims to title and ownership, not to "public 
trust" interests in property owned by others. 
The court distinguished us v. Title Insurance Co., 265 us 
472 (1924), where the Court held that Indians who retained a 
perpetual right to occupy certain lands under Mexican law did not 
retain that right in lands patented by private parties under the 
Act of 1851, because the right had not been asserted in the 
proceedings under the Act. The California court said: "We do not 
find this case to be convincing authority. The right to occupy 
land is normal incident of title, and we have no quarrel with the 
proposition that private persons who failed to assert their right 
to occupancy in the patent proceedings may not thereafter claim 
that right. But the right to exclude the public from tidelands 
is not a normal incident of title. To the contrary, as we have 
seen, conveyance of such lands by the government does not 
ordinarily free them from the burden of the public trust even 
though no reservation is made in the deed for the preservation of 
the people's interest." Petn App., at Al5. In summary, the 
California court held that petr's predecessors had tak~n title 
\,.,.,, ~ ~ --- • 
from Mexico subject to a "public trust," that California 
succeeded to this interest when it entered the Union, and that 
the state's failure to claim this interest in patent proceedings 
'----" undeL the Act of 1851 did not affect the interest. 
- 6 -
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr. (1) The California S. Ct 
correctly recognized that ownership of tidelands that were 
granted by the Mexican government to private citizens did not 
pass to California upon its admission to the Union. See US v. 
Coronado Beach Co., 255 us 472, 487-88 (1921). The lower court, 
however, engaged in a semantic sleight of hand by creating a 
"public trust" interest retained by the state. Under California I 
law a "public trust" interest leaves the owner of property with 
onl "naked title to the soil," People v. California Fish Co., 
166 Cal. 576, 598 (1913), and permits the state to make virtually 
any use it chooses of the land. For example, it may construct a 
YMCA, People v. City of Long Beach, 51 Cal.2d 875 (1959), or -drill for oil, Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148 (1928). 
California's failure to present its claim in the patent 
proceedings under the Act of 1851 precludes assertion of a 
"public trust" interest now. In Barker v. Harvey, 181 US 481 
1~ 
(1901), Indians who possessed a right of occupancy under Mexican 
law, sought to assert that right in federal court. This Court 
held that the right was abandoned when not asserted in federal 
patent proceedings under the 1851 Act: "Surely a claimant would 
have little reason for presenting to the land commission his 
claim to land, and securing a confirmation of that claim, if the 
only result was to transfer the naked fee to him burdened by an 
Indian right of permanent occupancy." Id., at 491-92. In US v. 
Title Insurance Co., 265 us 472 (1924), the Court adhered to 
Barker, saying that the "purpose of the Act of 1851 was to give 
repos~ to titles as well as to fulfill treaty obligations, and 
f 
- 7 -
that it not only permitted but required all claims to be 
presented to the commission, and barred all from future assertion 
which were not presented within the two years." M.•, at 483. 
Since the "public trust" interest claimed by California is at 
least as broad as that asserted by the Indians in Barker and 
Title Insurance Co., the lower court's attempt to distinguish the 
cases fails. 
(2) Under state law, only tidelands are subject to a 
"public trust" interest. Relying on expert testimony the 
California courts decided that petr's property constituted 
tidelands. This was error because in 1873 the General Land 
Office determined that the property was not tidelands, and 
because "if there is any one thing respecting the administration 
of the public lands which must be considered as settled by 
repeated adjudications of this court, it is that the decision of 
the land department upon mere ~ estions of fact is ... conclusive, 
4 
and such questions cannot thereafter be relitigated in the 
courts." Johnson v. Drew, 171 US 93, 99 (1898). The lower court 
decided that the General Land Office's determination as to 
whether Rancho Ballena was tidelands was ambiguous because the 
Office denominated the lagoon as an "inner bay," which, according 
to the 1951 edition of Webster's, meant tidelands; this is wrong. 
The Office decided that the lagoon was "not an arm of the sea" 
and this plainly resolves the question of whether the lagoon 
constituted tidelands. 
Resp • (1) Under California law title to tidal lands is 
.._____,. subject to a "public trust" easement, even when the patent 
- 8 -
conveying fee title to the land does not contain an explicit 
reservation of the interest. The grant of Rancho Ballona from 
the Mexican government to the Machados and Talamantes provided 
that "they may enclose it without prejudice to the traversing 
roads and servitudes •••• " This was incorporated by reference 
into both the Board of Land Commissioner's confirmation decree 
and a decision of the federal DC upholding the decree. Expert 
witnesses testified that this phrase reserved a "public trust" 
interest under Mexican law. See also Apalachicola Land & 
Development co. v. McRae, 86 Fla. 393 (1923). 
The question of whether the foregoing clause reserved in the 
Mexican government a "public trust" interest is not a federal 
question. This Court has established that a dispute as to the 
nature and extent of property rights gained under patents issued 
by the United States in confirmation of prior Mexican grants does 
not present a federal question. Los Angeles Milling Co. v. Los 
Angeles, 217 US 217; Devine v. Los Angeles, 202 US 313 (1906); 
Hooker v. Los Angeles, 188 us 314 (1903). 
Petr's claim that California abandoned its "public trust" 
interest by not asserting it in federal patent proceedings is 
without merit. The Board of Land Commissioners lacked 
jurisdiction to determine the validity of private land grants ________ .....,____,.._ =----",,..__ _____ _ 
made by prior sovereigns. The Board had authority only to 
determine the validity of fee simple interests. In Fremont v. 
us, 58 US 541 (1854), this Court held that the Board lacked 
jurisdiction to determine the validity of claims to mineral 
'----- rights. Petr's reliance on Barker v. Harvey, 181 US 481 (1901), 
- 9 -
is misplaced. That case involved the private claims of Mission 
Indians and the Act of 1851 was intended to "ascertain and settle 
private claims." As to public rights, however, there could have 
been no abandonment, Eldridge v Trezevant, 160 US 452 (1896); New 
Orleans v. us, 35 US 662 (1836). 
(2) Petr's argument that the General Land Office decision 
that Rancho Ballona was not tidelands does not present a federal 
question. In addition, as the California s. Ct held, the 
Office's decision was ambiguous, and thus has no preclusive 
effect. 
✓ 
Amicus. The California Land Title Association, acting on 
behalf of a number of title insurance companies, urges the Court 
to review the decision below. Thousands of policies insuring 
titles within Mexican land grants patented under the Act of 1851 
have been issued. These policies did not take into account the 
risk that the lands would be declared subject to "public trust" 
interests. Over 8,500,000 acres of California land derives from u/d}.J' 
federally-patented Mexican grants,- which generally included 
shallow lagoons, sloughs, ·streams, and ponds -- much of which may 
be tidelands for purposes of the public trust doctrine. The 
United States owns a substantial amount of property obtained from 
private parties, which is subject to a "public trust" interest. 
The decision below, if allowed to stand, will cloud title to vast -amounts of California, and foreclose title insurance for similar 
areas. Moreover, under the law of Mexico "fountains," "the sandy , 
beaches on the banks of rivers," "the commons and roads trave_rsed 
- 10 -
by horses," "mountains," and "pastures" are subject to a public 
trust, and California could claim rights to such property. 
A federally-patented, Mexican land grant is good against 
both private parties and the government. See Beard v. Federy, 70 
US 478, 492 (1866) ("As against the government this record [a 
federal patent], so long as it remains unvacated, is 
conclusive."). Amicus also repeats petr's argument that a 
reexamination of factual question decided by the General Lands 
Office is improper. 
4. DISCUSSION: The decision below appears important 
because of the co~siderable amount of,,,12rOBerty in southern 
California that derived from)federally-patented Mexican land 
... , 
grants and because of the sweeping character of a "public trust" ---interest. The question of what property interests petr and the 
state received as a result of the Act of 1851 patent proceedings 
seems clearly to be a question of federal law. State Land Board 
v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 US 363, 375 (1977); Knight v. 
United States Land Association, 142 US 161, 183-84 (1891). 
On the merits, the case is difficult. The California s. 
Ct's treatment of the effect of the failure of the state to 
assert its "public trust" claim in the Act of 1851 patent 
proceedings is somewhat inconsistent with this Court's decisions 
in the area. In US v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 US 472, 487-88 
(1921), the Court indicated in dicta that California's title to 
certain tidal lands was subject to prior Mexican grants that had 
been federally patented. Similar results were reached in US v. 
--..__,/ Title•Insurance & Trust Co., 265 US 472 (1924), and Barker v. 
- 11 -
Heavey, 181 US 481 (1901), in cases where Indians sought to claim 
rights to occupancy that had been long recognized but not 
asseited in patent proceedings under the Act of 1851. 
The distinctions offered by the lower court and resp are 
not completely persuasive. The California S. Ct relied on the -fact that occupancy is a "normal incident of title" and thus the 
Indians in Barker and Title Insurance & Trust were required to 
have claimed this type of right in federal patent proceedings. A 
"public trust" interest, however, is at least as significant and ? ? 
intrusive an interest as a right to occupancy, and the California 
court's distinction is thus not particularly strong. Resp also 
draws a distinction between public and private claims. This 
seems foreclosed, however, by US v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 US 
472, 487-88 (1921), which indicated that California was bound to 
present its claims to the patent commission under the Act of 
1851. See also Beard v. Federy, 70 US 478, 490 (1866). Resp 
also argues that Townsend v. Greeley, 72 US 326, 335 (1866) (no 
obligation to assert equitable interests in Act of 1851 patent 
proceedings), made it unnecessary for the state to assert its 
public trust interest in the patent proceedings. This decision 
seems to provide the best basis for distinguishing this case from 
the Barker, Title Insurance & Trust Co., and Coronado Beach Co., 
decisions, since the interest asserted by the state seems to be 
some sort of trust interest. Nonetheless, Townsend did not 
involve the peculiar "public trust" interest presented here and 
it is unclear to me whether that decision should apply to this 
...___,,. type of interest: Townsend apparently did not apply in the Indian 
- 12 -
occupancy cases which involve interests similar to the ) blic 
trust" interest. In summary, the governing precedents are ------ ------
unclear, particularly as applied to the novel "public trust" -interest. To the extent I understand them, I think these 
precedents are somewhat inconsistent with the decision below. 
Because of the widespread economic significance of the case, the 
Court should give serious consideration to a grant. (The SG' s 
..-::: -
views might also be upeful, given the extensive federal land 
'--- - -holdings that might be affected.) 
I do not recommend reviewing the second question raised by 
petr. The question turns on a factual determination of what was 
meant by a particular land grant in 1873 and involves no 
principles of general significance. 
There is a response and one amicus brief. 
December 28, 1982 Born Op. in Petn 
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Summa Corp. v. California 
No. 82-708 
Question Presented 
February 26, 1984 
Whether a United States patent, issued to confirm title 
to land granted to private owners by the Mexican government, re-
served to California a "public trust" interest in tidelands in-
----------- --------···-· ·---- ··-· -~__.lit 
eluded within the patent. 




A. Jurisdiction and Mexican Law Questions 
B. Reservation of the Public Trust 
c. Equal Footing Doctrine 










bench memo: Summa l :p. v. California page 3. 
I. Background 
Under the California "public trust" doctrine, the state 
holds a trust interest on behalf of the public in tidelands. 
Private persons hold these lands subject to the eublic's right 
use the lands for commerce, navigation and recreation. 
The present suit involves the applicability of the doc-
trine to the Ballena Lagoon, now an arm of the Pacific Ocean. 
-4,-/ ( 
The lagoon lies within a tract of land granted by the Mexican 
government to private individuals in 1839. After the United-
States acquired California, the owners of the land filed their 
claim to it with the Board of Land Commissioners. Congress had 
created the Board to confirm the claims of Mexican citizens to 
California land, as the United States had agreed in the treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo to respect Mexican property rights in the ter-
ritories acquired from Mexico. 
The Board approved the claim, and the District Court - - ------
affirmed. A survey of the confirmed claim was then approved by -the Surveyor General and submitted to the General Land Office, 
that was responsible for issuing patents. The Office in 1873 
issued a patent that included the lagoon within the bounds of ~-------------- ----- -
property, although the parties now dispute whether the patent 
~
unambiguously includes a determination of the character of the 
Lagoon -- whether it was an "arm of the sea" or merely a non-
tidal, inland pond. 
The present suit arose when resp Los Angeles invoked the 
doctrine to make various "improvements" in the lagoon. The City 
filed a quiet title action against petr, and other owners of the 
bench memo: Summa ( p. v. California - page 4. 
lagoon, alleging that it owned a "public trust" easement in the 
lagoon. The State, a necessary party under California and a resp 
here, supported the City's claim. The TC determined that the 
City did have an easement and that, in any case, the defendants 
had dedicated the property to public use. 
The California S.Ct. affirmed, reaching only the TC's 
holding on the public trust doctrin-e. Accepting that the patent 
was a final determination of rights to the property, the state -
court found the patent ambiguous as to whether the lagoon was 
tidelands. It found that other evidence admitted before the TC 
....... _ -···--· -
-- 'i \', demonstrated that the agoon was tidelands. The state court then 
found, citing the testimony at trial of an expert on Mexican law, 
that petr's predecessors in interest had been granted the proper-
ty subject to the public's rights in the tidelands. The reserved 
interest was acquired by the TTnited States when it annexed the 
territory, and then passed to California when it became a state. 
II. Discussion 
A. Jurisdiction and Mexican Law Questions 
Resps' contention that the Court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction is without merit. The cited cases involved property 
rights conceded to have been incorporated from Mexican law into 
the federal patents. E.g., Los Angeles Milling Co. v. Los Ange-
les, 217 U.S. 217, 226 (1910). The Court held the scope of these 
rights was a question of state law. In contrast, the present 
• 
case require? the Court to consider whether the federal patents 
ins..or:e_ora te 1:.!le "public trust" easement that arguably would ob-
ta in under Mexican law. -------
bench memo: Summa :p. v. California - page 5. 
The SG further urges the Court to reach the issue wheth-
er Mexican law would have recognized the "public trust" easement, 
arguing ~ the line of cases culminating in Los Angeles Milling 
Co. was overruled by United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 217-218 
(1942). The Pink case reviewed, although with some degree of 
deference, a New York court's determination of Russian property 
law that governed the scope of the Litvinov Agreement, under 
which the United States acquired various extraterritorial proper-
ties that had been expropriated by the Soviet government. This 
case is slender authority for overruling Los Angeles Milling Co. 
Pink posed foreign law issues of importance to the property and 
foreign relations interests of the United States: no state policy 
was at stake. In Los Angeles Milling Co. -- a case that, like 
the present one, involved the water rights of Los Angeles -- the 
state interests in the foreign law issue were great, as the Mexi-
can law would become the state common law of property for much of 
California and would determine the rights of a state 
intrumentality: and no federal interest was directly implicated. 
The SG's position would give the federal courts jurisdiction over 
a number of ordinary property disputes. 
Although the Court undoubtedly has the power to deter-
/ \, I 
mine that the ~ alifornia courts' determination of Mexican law is 
so erroneous as to threaten the integrity of the patent rights ----------------------------
confirmed by the United States, neither the record nor the SG's 
brief seems to support this determination. 
bench memo: ~ v. California page 6. 
B. Reservation of the Public Trust 
Although it is a close question, it does not appear that 
the failure of California to assert its public trust claim for-
feited that claim. ¾-overning principle appears to be that the 
(\ - ---
government reserves such rights to lands granted by it "as may -----------· appear on the face of the grant, or the law under which it was 
made, or be declared by a general statute in force at the time 
the interest of grantee was acquired." United States v. Rindge, 
208 F. 611 (1913). Although the reservation of the public trust 
is not explicit in the grant, the law under which the grant was 
made by Mexico and confirmed by the United States appears to have 
I ( \J\ 
contemplated such a reservation. The public trust in tidelands 
is not, under Mexican law, a right that would attach only to 









Rather, the record indicates that the public trust attaches to j y?~ 
I I • \.\ , , ..l_ _ .J..-
all tidelands simply as a consequence of their geological condi- TYl-',-4;1 -
tion. See JA, at 221-222. As the state under Mexican law could ~ -- H~ 
not grant these lands to private individuals, a grant of lands 
whose boundaries included tidelands need not contain an explici~ 
~e:.----
reservation of the public trust in order to preserve that right. 
For this reasons, the claim does not appear to be the type th~ 
Congress intended to have asserted in these proceedings. Con H ~ 
gress's primary concern appears to have been to resolve claim? ~of:;7,.,,., 
property that rested upon particular grants or reservations ~~ 
title by the Mexican government. 
In this respect, the public trust in tidelands would 
differ from those public rights in particular easements, such as 
bench memo: ~ v. California page 7. 
roadways, that the state may have preserved by general saving 
language in a deed. Easements usually arise not from the geolog-
ical features of the land itself but from a particular claim of 
right; further, the state had the power to extinguish the ease-
ment or grant it to private persons. Such easements, like fee 
claims to land by the state, could only be proven against con-
trary private claims by particular deeds, and would have to have 
been substantiated before the Board of Land Commissioners. THe 
public trust in tidelands is clearly different. 
Although no case directly establishes this point, this 
appears most consistent with the pattern of decision in analogous 
property cases. The Court has recognized that decisions of the 
Board of Land Commissioners finally disposed of sovereign claims 
with respect to fee interests to particular properties, e.g. 
United States v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 U.S. 472 (1921), and 
lesser rights, including easements and mineral rights, asserted 
as to particular lands or on the basis of particular grants, 
either by private parties, e.g., Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481 
(1901); United States v. Castillero, 67 U.S. 17, 166 (1862). In 
contrast, rights such as easements of access to navigable waters 
attach without express reservation by the patent. E.g. New Or-
leans v. United States, 35 U.S. 662 (1836); Eldridge v. 
Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452 (1896). 
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the resps' posi-
1( ~ 
tion is the sweeping possessory interest a ~ ld 
acquire over the land under the public trust doctrine. It ap-





bench memo: Summa :p. v. California - page 8. 
exercises his possessory interest only at the pleasure of the 
state. But that is true as well of other navigational servitude 
or easements, within the scope of the easement, and so does not 
distinguish the present case. Nor does petr argue that Califor-
nia has extended the public trust doctrine beyond what would rea-
sonably have been reserved by Mexico at the time of the original 
grant, and there is no evidence in the record to support that 
argument. 
C. Equal Footing Doctrine 
Although the SG correctly argues that the Court has nev-
er held that a public trust easement passed to states under the 
Equal Footing Doctrine, a contrary holding would be inconsistent __________ ....,.....,. 
with the principles underlying the Doctrine. There is no reason 
to distinguish the "public trust" easement from other property 
rights, including both ownership in fee and lesser proerty inter-
ests, Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 
(1892), that pass to the states under the Doctrine. As the SG 
acknowledges, the navigational servitude did not pass to the 
state under the Doctrine because it is an attribute of the police 
power rather than a proprietary right. 
D. Estoppel Effect of the Board's Determination 
Although the federal patent conclusively resolves any 
question of title, it appears that the federal patent at issue 
here does not consider the question whether the lagoon was tide-
• 
land.-4he General Land Office was concerned whether the outer 
_,,,---
boundary of the patented land was the shore of the lagoon or the 
ocean. The Office noted that on the "diseno" that was part of 
bench memo: Summa (~v. California page 9. 
the Mexican grant, no bay was indicated; it reasoned that it was 
unlikely that the grant would be silent as to so prominent fea-
ture of the land and so returned the survey for confirmation of 
the survey. JA, at 33. 
The ex parte affidavits filed with the Land Office upon 
subsequent proceedings indicate that the lagoon was not tidal. 
This conclusion was adopted by the Surveyor-General in his report 
~ to the Secretary of the Interior. JA, at 92-93. And the map 
attached to the patent deleted an earlier reference to an 
"inlet." N~ ss, petr's reliance upon the patent as conclu-
sive evidence that there is no public trust impressed upon its 
property is not without difficulty. The decision of the Secre-
tary finds the weight of the evidence cited by the Surveyor-
General "establishes the correctness of the survey in its 
location of the northern (or northwestern) line of the Ballena 
[property] according to the decree of confirmation [that] estab-
lishes the boundary in question II JA, at 100. The Secretary 
apparently did not consider the question of the character of the 
lagoon, that was irrelevant to the location of the northern 
boundary. As the Surveyor-General and the Secretary determined 
around this time not to permit proof by ex parte affidavits, it 
seems questionable whether the finding that the lagoon was not an 
inlet, if necessary to the decision, would have been affirmed. 
Further, the patent itself incorporates the field notes of the 
• 
original , survey, that petr concedes to have considered the lagoon 
to be an arm of the sea. JA, at 103. The terms of the patent 
itself contain nothing that would contradict these notes. 
t bench memo: Summa ( .....J2..!- v. California page 10. 
It thus does not appear that the patent definitively 
resolves the question whether the lagoon is an arm of the sea. 
The patent itself supports contradictory inferences; and the only 
other reference to the question in the proceedings that led to 
the issuance of the patent is a report of testimony upon which 
the Department itself would not have relied in issuing a patent. 
And resolution of the tidelands issue was not necessary to any of 
the points contested by the rival claimants or questioned by the 
Land Office in requesting a second survey. To the contrary, the 
rou hly contemporaneous U.S. Coast Survey refers to the lagoon as 
an "estuary," and the evidence in the record unequivocally indi-
~ --- - ----------------··--- -
cates that the lagoon was tidal. 
III. Conclusion 
With some hesitation, I conclude that the state court's 
decision should be affirmed. It appears that the public trust is 
b 
. i( . \,\ . 
est understood as attaching to tidelands even in the absence of 
.... 
an express reservation by the grant of title; and that in issuing 
the patent to the property in question here, the government made 
--no determination that the lagoo"n was not tidelands. Although 
California'~ exten~iori ~f the public trust doctrine may raise 
constitutional questions, those questions are not before the 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Jim 
Re: Summa Corp. v. California, No.~ 
The State has filed a brief in opposition to the memorandum for --
the U.S. It argues that the SG admits that the lands in question 
I/ ,, 
were and are tidelands and that, under the laws of Mexico in effect 
at the time of the Mexican conveyance to petr's predecessors in 
interest, tidelands were subj ect to a "public trust easement." - :::::::::::::: ::::: - . 
Indeed, the original Mexican grant contains a specific, express 
reservation of such public rights, and this reservation was 
incorporated by reference into the U.S.'s Decree of Confirmation. 
Even if there were no such reservation, the Court in Fremont v. 
United States, 58 U.S. 541 (1854), decided that "trust" interests 
are not affected by proceedings to confirm private titles conveyed 
by prior sovereigns upon cession to the U.S. Cal. recognizes the 
, I { '- \ 
underlying fee title of petr, but claims only one incident of 
ownership. Indeed, the federal government itself recognized that ----
the public trust servitude exists over tidelands within ranchos. 
7 
See United States v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 U.S. 472, 482 (1921) 
(SG's arguments). The incidents stemming from private ownership of 
property have traditionally been defined according to state law and 
this Court has consistently held that no federal question is >f-





affected by this case in that it holds a similar title interest in 
the subject tidelands which is paramount to that of Calif. 
The City of L.A. has also submitted a brief in opposition to 
the petn for cert. ~· 
I think this is a very complicated case, a am somewhat 
unsure of my grasp of all the issues. I am 'nclined, however, to 
believe that there is a substantial issue whether there is a federal 
question presented by the case. The importance of this 
Cal. is doubtful, because it only jffects tioelands and 
i ~ that. k /.l t this ~imiao ==no:= t ; nk .. it is : n 
------ /rt, .A, 
case for this Court's review. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-708 
SUMMA CORPORATION, PETITIONER v. CALIFOR-
NIA EX REL. STATE LANDS COMMISSION 
AND CITY OF LOS ANGELES 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF CALIFORNIA 
[April -, 1984] 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner owns the fee title to property known as the 
Ballona Lagoon, a narrow body of water connected to Marina 
del Rey, a man-made harbor located in a part of the City of 
Los Angeles called Venice. Venice is located on the Pacific 
Ocean between the Los Angeles International Airport and 
the City of Santa Monica. The present case arises from a 
lawsuit brought by respondent City of Los Angeles against 
petitioner Summa Corp. in state court, in which the City al-
leged that it held an easement in the Ballona Lagoon for com-
merce, navigation, and fishing, for the passage of fresh wa-
ters to the Venice Canals, and for water recreation. The 
State of California, joined as a defendant as required by state 
law, filed a cross-complaint alleging that it had acquired an 
interest in the lagoon for commerce, navigation, and fishing 
upon its admission to the Union, that it held this interest in 
trust for the public, and that it had granted this interest to 
the City of Los Angeles. The City's complaint indicated that 
it wanted to dredge the lagoon and make other improvements 
without having to exercise its power of eminent domain over 
p~titioner's property. The trial court ruled in favor of re-
spondents, finding that the lagoon was subject to the public 
trust easement claimed by the City and the State, who had 
the right to construct improvements in the lagoon without 
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exercising the power of eminent domain or compensating the 
landowners. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the 
ruling of the trial court. City of Los Angeles v. Venice Pen-
insula Properties, 31 Cal. 3d 288 (1982). 
In the Supreme Court of California, petitioner asserted 
that the Ballona Lagoon had never been tideland, that-even if 
it had been tideland, Mexican law imposed no servitude on 
the fee interest by reason of that fact, and that even if it were 
tideland and subject to a servitude under Mexican law, such a 
servitude was forfeited by the failure of the State to assert it 
in the federal patent proceedings. The Supreme Court of 
California ruled against petitioner on all three of these 
grounds. We now reverse that judgment, holding that even 
if it is assumed thattheBaHona Lagoon was art of tidelanas 
su ~ec y ex1can a!Y, o the serv1tu e described bDh,.e Su-
preme Court of California, the 'State's clainfto such a servi-
tude mu ave een resented in the federal patent proceed-
ing in order o survive the issue of a fee patent. 1 
1 Respondents argue that the decision below presents simply a question 
concerning an incident of title, which even though relating to a patent is-
sued under a federal statute raises only a question of state law. They rely 
on cases such as Hooker v. Los Angeles, 188 U. S. 314 (1903), Los Angeles 
Milling Co. v. Los Angeles, 217 U. S. 217 (1910), and Boquillas Land & 
Cattle Co. v. Curtis, 213 U. S. 339 (1909). These cases all held, quite 
properly in our view, that questions of riparian water rights under patents 
issued under the 1851 Act did not raise a substantial federal question 
merely because the conflicting claims were based upon such patents. But 
the co~rov~~ in_ ~e r,r~se, unlike those cases, turns on the proper 
construclionof me AcfofMarch 3, 1851. Were the rule otherwise, this 
Courts dec1s10n in arker v. Harvey, 181 U. S. 481 (1901), would have 
been to dismiss the appeal, which was the course taken in Hooker, rather 
than to decide the case on the merits. See also Beard v. Federy, 3 Wall. 
478 (1866). The opinion below clearly recognized as much, for the Califor-
nia Supreme Court wrote, "under the Act of 1851, the federal government 
succeeded to Mexico's right in the tidelands granted to the defendants' 
predecessors upon annexation of California," 31 Cal. 3d at 298, an interest 
that "was acquired by California upon its admission to statehood," id., at 
302. Thus, our jurisdiction is based on the need to determine whether the 
82-708-OPINION 
SUMMA CORP. v. CALIFORNIA EX REL. LANDS COMM'N 3 
Petitioner's title to the lagoon, like all the land in Marina 
del Ray, dates back to 1839, when the Mexican Governor of 
California granted to Augustin and Ignacio Machado and 
Felipe and Tomas Talamantes a property known as the Ran-
cho Ballona. 2 The land comprising the Rancho Ballona be-
provisions of the 1851 Act operate to preclude California from now assert-
ing its public trust easement. 
The 1839 grant to the Machados and Talamantes contained a reservation 
that the grantees may enclose the property "without prejudice to the tra-
versing roads and servitudes [servidumbres]." App. 5. According to ex-
pert testimony at trial, under Las Siete Partidas, the law in effect at the 
time of the Mexican grant, this reservation in the Machados' and 
Talamantes' grant was intended to preserve the rights of the public in the 
tidelands enclosed by the boundaries of the Rancho Ballona. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court reasoned that this interest was similar to the common 
law public trust imposed on tidelands. Petitioner and amicus United 
States argue, however, that this reservation was never intended to create 
a public trust easement of the magnitude now asserted by California. At 
most this reservation was inserted in the Mexican grant simply to preserve 
existing roads and paths for use by the public. See United States v. Coro-
nado Beach Co., 255 U. S. 472, 485-486 (1921); Barker v. Harvey, 181 
U. S. 472 (1901); cf. Jover v. Insular Government, 221 U. S. 623 (1911). 
While it is beyond cavil that we may take a fresh look at what Mexican law 
may have been in 1839, see United States v. Perot, 98 U. S. 428, 430 (1878); 
Fremont v. United States, 17 How. 541, 556 (1854), we find it unnecessary 
to determine whether Mexican law imposed such an expansive easement on 
grants of private property. 
2 The Rancho Ballona occupied an area of approximately 14,000 acres 
and included a tidelands area of about 2,000 acres within its boundaries. 
The present-day Ballona Lagoon is virtually all that remains of the former 
tidelands, with fillinganddevelopment or natural conditions transforming 
most of much larger lagoon area into dry land. Although Respondent Los 
Angeles claims that the present controversy involves only what remains of 
the old lagoon, a fair reading of California law suggests that the State's \ 
claimed public trust servitude can be extended over land no longer subject 
to the tides if the land was tidelands when California became a state. See 
City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462 (1970). 
The Mexican grantees acquired-title through a formal process that began 
with a petition to the Mexican Governor of California. Their petition was 
forwarded to the City Council of Los Angeles, whose committee on vacant 
lands approved the request. Formal vesting of title took place after the 
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came part of the United States following the war between the 
United States and Mexico, which was formally ended by the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848. 9 Stat. 922. Under 
the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo the United 
States undertook to protect the property rights of Mexican 
lan~ ua a upe i a go, I, Stat. 
929, at t e same time settlers were moving into California in 
large numbers to exploit the mineral wealth and other re-
sources of the new territory. Mexican grants encompassed 
well over 10,000,000 acres in California and included some of 
the best land suitable· for development. H. R. Rep. No. 1, 
33d Cong., 2d Sess., 4-5 (1854). As we wrote long ago: ......, 
"The country was new, and rich in mineral wealth, and 
attracted settlers, whose industry and enterprise pro-
duced an unparalleled state of prosperity. The en-
hanced value given to the whole surface of the country 
by the discovery of gold, made it necessary to ascertain 
and settle all private land claims, so that the real estate 
belonging to individuals could be separated from the 
public domain." Peralta v. United States, 3 Wall. 434, 
439 (1_§_§5); see also Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U. S. 
238, 244 (1889). 
To fulfill its obligations under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hi-
dalgo and to provide for an orderly settlement of Mexican 
land claims, Congress passed the Act of March 3, 1851, set-
ting up a comprehensive claims settlement procedure. 
Under the terms o e Act, a Board o I;an omm1ss1oners 
was ·established with the power to decide the rights of "each 
and every person claiming lands in California by virtue of any 
right or title derived from the Spanish or Mexican govern-
ment .... " Act of March 3, 1851, § 8, ch. 41, 9 Stat. 631, 632. 
The Board was to decide the validity of any claim according 
Rancho had been inspected, a Mexican judge had completed "walking the 
boundaries," App. 213, and the conveyance duly registered. See gener-
ally App. 1-13; United States v. Pico, 5 Wall. 536, 539 (1866). 
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to "the laws, usages, and customs" of Mexico, id., at § 11, 
while parties before the Board had the right to appeal to the 
District Court for a de novo determination of their rights, id., 
at§ 9; Grisar v. McDowell, 6 Wall. 363, 375 (1867), and to ap-
peal to this Court, id., at § 10. Claimants were required to 
present their claims within two years, however, or have their 
claims barred. Id., at § 13, see Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 
U. S: 238 (1889). The final decree of the Board, or any pat-
ent issued under the Act, was also a conclusive adjudication 
of the rights of the claimant as against the United States, but 
not against the interests of third parties with superior titles. 
Act of March 3, 1851, § 15. 
In 1852 the Machados and the Talamantes petitioned the 
Boa:rclfor confirmation of their title under the Act. Follow-
ing a hearing, the petition was gran e ~oard, App. 
21, and affirmed by the United States District Court on ap-
peal, App. 22-23. Before a patent could issue, however, a 
survey of the property had to be approved by the Surveyor 
General of California. The survey for this purpose was com-
pleted in 1858, and although it was approved by the Surveyor 
General of California, it was rejected upon submission to the 
General Land Office of the Department of Interior. App. 
32-34. 
In the confirmation proceedings that followed, the pro-
posed survey was readvertised and interes a:rfies in-
forme o t eir · o pa 1cipate in the proceedings. 3 The 
3 It is undisputed that the State had the right to participate in the pat-
ent proceedings leading to confirmation of the Machados' and Talamantes' 
grant. The State asserts that as a "practice" it did not participate in con-
firmation proceedings under the 1851 Act. Brief of Respondent California 
16, n. 17. In point of fact, however, the State participated in just such a 
proceeding involving a rancho near the Rancho Ballona. See National Ar-
chives, RG 49, California Land Claims, Docket 414. Moreover, before the 
Mexican grant was confirmed, Congress passed a statute ~pecially confer-
ring a right on all parties claiming an interest in any tract embraced by a 
published survey to file objections to the survey. Act of July 1, 1864, § 1, 
ch. 194, 13 Stat. 332. 
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property owners immediately north of the Rancho Ballona 
protested the proposed survey of Rancho Ballona; the Macha-
dos and Talamantes, the original grantees, filed affidavits in 
support of their claim. As a result of these submissions, as 
well as a consideration of the surveyor's field notes and un- j 
derlying Mexican documents, the General Land Office with-
drew its objection to the proposed ocean boundary. The 
Secretary of the Interior subsequently approved the survey 
and in 1873 a patent was issued confirming title in the Rancho 
Ballona to the original Mexican grantees. App. 101-109. 
Significantly, the federal patent issued to the Machados and 
Talamantes made no mention of any public trust interest such 
as the one asserted by California in the present proceedings. 
The public trust easement claimed by California in this } 
lawsuit has been interpreted to apply to all lands which were 
tidelands at the time California became a state, irrespective 
of the present character of the land. See City of Long Beach 
v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 486-487 (1970). Through this 
easement, the State has an overriding power to enter upon 
the property and possess it, to make physical changes in the 
property, and to control howjh_e pr.o__pertr is used. See 
Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259-260 (1971); Pe ople v. 
California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 596-599 (1913). Although 
the landowner retains legal title to the property, he controls 
little more than the naked fee, for any proposed private use 
remains subject to the right of the State or any member of 
the public to assert the State's public trust easement. See 
Marks v. Whitney, supra. 
The question we face is whether a property interest so sub- 1 
stantially in derogation of the fee interest patented to peti-
tioner s predecessors can survive t e patent proceedings con-
ducted ursuant to the statuteT mplementing the Treaty of 
Gua alupe Hi algo. e ~ t. The federal gov-
ernment, of course, cannot dispose of a right possessed by 
the State under the equal footing doctrine of the United 
States Constitution. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 
'82-70S-OPINION 
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(1845). Thus, an ordinary federal patent purporting to con-
vey tidelands located within a state to a private individual is 
invalid, since the United States holds such tidelands only in 
trust for the state. Borax Co. v. Los Angeles, 296 U. S. 10, 
15-16 (1935). But the Court in Borax recognized that a dif-
ferent result would follow if the private lands had been pat-
ented under the 1851 Act. Id., at 19. Patents confirmed 
under the authority of the 1851 Act were issued "pursuant to 
the authority reserved to the United States to enable it to 
discharge its international duty with respect to land which, 
although tidelands, had not passed to the State." Id., at 21. 
See also State Land Board v. Corvalis Sand & Gravel Co., 
429 U. S. 363, 375 (1977); Knight v. United States Land 
Assn., 142 U. S. 161 (1891). 
This fundamental distinction refle ts / 
of the 1851 ct enacted by Con ess. 
was mten e o implement this country's obligations under 
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the 1851 Act also served an 
overriding purpose of providing repose to land titles that 
originated with Mexican grants. As the Court noted in 
Peralta v. United States, 3 Wall. 434 (1865), the territory in 
California was undergoing a period of rapid development and 
exploitation, primarily as a result of the finding of gold at 
Sutter's Mill in 1848. See generally J. Caughey, California 
238-255 (1953). It was essential to determine which lands 
were private property and which lands were in the public do-
main in order that interested parties could determine what 
land was available from the government. The 1851 Act was 
intended "to place the titles to land in California upon a stable 
foundation, and to give the parties who possess them an 
opportunity of placing them on the records of this country, in 
a manner and form that will prevent future controversy." 
Fremont v. United States, 17 How. 542, 553-554 (1854); ac-
cord, Thompson v. Los Angeles Farming Co., 180 U. S. 72, 
77 (1901). 
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California argues that since its public trust servitude is a 
sovereign right, the interest did not have to be reserved ex-
pressly on the federal patent to survive the confirmation pro-
ceedings. 4 Patents issued pursuant to the 1851 Act were, of 
course, confirmatory patents that did not expand the title of 
• In support of this argument the State cites to Montana v. United 
States, 450 U. S. 544 (1981), and Illinois Central R. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 
387 (1892), in support of its proposition that its public trust servitude sur-
vived the 1851 Act confirmation proceedings. While Montana v. United 
States and Illinois Central R. v. Illinois support the proposition that alien-
ation of the beds of navigable waters will not be lightly inferred, property 
underlying navigable waters can be conveyed in recognition of an "interna-
tional duty." Montana v. United States, su-pra, 450 U. S. at 552. 
Whether the Ballona Lagoon was navigable under federal law in 1850 is 
open to speculation. The trial court found only that the present-day la-
goon was navigable, App. to Pet. for Cert. A-52, while respondent Los An-
geles concedes that the lagoon was not navigable in 1850, Brief of Respond-
ent Los Angeles 29. The obligation of the United States to respect the 
property rights of Mexican citizens was, of course, just such an interna-
tional obligation, made express by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and 
inherent in the law of nations, see United States v. Moreno, l Wall. 400, 
404 (1863); United States v. Fossatt, 21 How. 445, 448 (1858). 
The State also argues that the Court has previously recognized that sov-
ereign interests need not be asserted during proceedings confirming pri-
vate titles. The State's reliance on New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 
662 (1836), and Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U. S. 452 (1892), in support of 
its argument is misplaced, however. Neither of these cases involved titles 
confirmed under the 1851 Act. In New Orleans v. United States, for ex-
ample, the board of comissioners in that case could only make recommenda-
tions to Congress, in contrast to the binding effect of a decree issued by the 
Board under the 1851 Act. Thus, we held in that case that the City of 
New Orleans could assert public rights over riverfront property which 
were previously rejected by the board of commissioners. New Orleans v. 
United States, 10 Pet., at 733-734. The decision in Eldridge v. Trezevant, 
su-pra, did not even involve a· confirmatory patent, but simply the question 
whether an outright federal grant was exempt from long-standing local law 
permitting construction of a levee on private property for public safety 
purposes. While the Court held that the federal patent did not extin-
guish the servitude, the interest asserted in that case was not a "right of 
permanent occupancy," Barker v. Harvey, 181 U. S. 481, 491 (1901), such 
as that asserted by the State in this case. 
82-708-OPINION 
SUMMA CORP. v. CALIFORNIA EX REL. LANDS COMM'N 9 
the original Mexican grantee. Beard v. Federy, 3 Wall. 478 
(1865). But our decisions in a line of cases beginning with j 
Barker v. Harvey, 181 U. S. 481 (1901), effectively dispose of 
California's claim that it did not have to assert its interest 
during the confirmation proceedings. In Barker the Court 
was presented with a claim brought on behalf of certain Mis-
sion Indians for a permanent right of occupancy on property 
derived from grants from Mexico. The Indians' claim to a 
right of occupancy was derived from a reservation placed on 
the original Mexican grants permitting the grantees to fence 
in the property without "interfering with the roads, cross-
roads, and other usages." Id., at 494, 495. The Court re-
jected the Indians' claim, holding that: 
"If these Indians had any claims founded on the action of 
the Mexican Government they abandonded them by not 
presenting them to the Commission for consideration, 
and , they could not, therefore, . . . 'resist successfully 
any action of the government in disposing of the prop-
erty.' If it be said that the Indians do not claim the fee, 
but only the right of occupation, and therefore, they do 
not come within the provision of § 8 as persons 'claiming 
lands in California by virtue of any right or title derived 
from the Spanish or Mexican Government,' it may be re-
plied that a claim of a right to a permanent occupancy of 
land is one of far-reaching effect, and it could not well be 
said that the lands burdened with a right of permanent 
occupancy were part of the public domain and subject to 
the full disposal of the United States. . . . Surely a 
claimant would have little reason for presenting to the 
Land Commission his claim to land, and securing a con-
firmation of that claim, if the only result was to transfer 
the naked fee to him, burdened by an Indian right of per-
manent occupancy." Id. at 491-492 (quoting Beard v. 
Federy, 3 Wall. 478, 493 (1865)). 
The Court followed its holding in Barker in a subsequent 
case presenting a similar question, in which the Indians 
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claimed an aboriginal right of occupancy derived from Span-
ish and Mexican law that could only be extingui~hed by some 
affirmative act of the sovereign. United States v. Title Ins. 
& Trust Co., 265 U. S. 472 (1924). Although it was sug-
gested to the Court that Mexican law recognized such an ab-
original right, Brief for Appellant in United States v. Title 
Ins. & Trust Co., 0. T. 1923, No. 358, p. 14-16, cf. Chouteau 
v. Molony, 16 How. 203, 229 (1853), the Court applied its de-
cision in Barker to hold that because the Indians failed to as-
sert their interest within the timespan established by the 
1851 Act, their claimed right of occupancy was barred. The 
Court declined an invitation to overrule its decision in Barker 
because of the adverse effect of such a decision on land titles, 
a result that counseled adherence to a settled interpretation. 
Id., at 486. 
Finally, in United States v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 U. S. 
472 (1921), the government argued that even if the land-
owner held title to the tidelands by reason of the Mexican 
grant, a condemnation award should be reduced to reflect the 
servitude of the federal and state governments to protect 
navigation, commerce, and fisheries, an interest that the gov-
ernment asserted was paramount to the company's fee inter-
est. The Court expressly rejected the government's argu-
ment, holding that the patent proceedings were conclusive as 
against the United States in its sovereign capacity, 255 
U. S., at 488, and could not be collaterally attacked by the 
government. The necessary result of the Coronado Beach 
decision is that sovereign claims such as those raised by the 
United States in Coronado Beach on its own behalf or on be-
half of the State must likewise be asserted in the condemna-
tion proceedings or be barred. /' ) . ~ jJ. ,. ._ 
These decisions control the outcome of this case. We hold ~
that Califorrua cannot at tliis a a ass s public trust 
easement over petitioner's property, when petitioner's I 
predecessors-in-interest had their interest confirmed without \ 
any mention of such an easement in proceedings take~u-
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ant to the Act of 1851. The interest claimed by California is 
one of such substantial magnitude that regardless of the fact 
that the claim is asserted by the State in its sovereign capac-
ity, this interest, like the Indian claims made in Barker and in 
United States v. Title Insurance Co., must have been pre-
sented in the patent proceeding or be barred. Accordingly, 
the judgment of the Supreme Court of California is reversed, 
and the case is remanded to that court for further proceed-
ings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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